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Introduction
Malware suppliers, agents, and customers play import-
ant roles in the cybercrime economy. Malware suppli-
ers include technically skilled individuals who produce 
and distribute malicious code; agents who act on be-
half of malware suppliers or directly interact with cus-
tomers; and customers who purchase goods and 
services to gain unauthorized access to compromised 
computers’ data and resources, steal e-currency, ex-
filtrate victims' personal information, and so on (Kam-
luk, 2009). 
The modes that malware suppliers use to provide 
goods and services to customers increase illicit monet-
ization opportunities and enable many of the recent 
security breaches that have targeted some of the 
largest financial, government, military, and retail insti-
tutions in the world (Ablon et al., 2014; Armin, 2013; 
Gu, 2013; Samani, 2013). However, it is difficult to un-
derstand what these modes have in common, what 
makes them different, and what their potential com-
binations may be. 
Consider the following examples of malware supplier 
modes:
1. Dark0de: a multisided platform that served as a venue 
for the sale and trade of hacking services, botnets, mal-
ware, and other illicit goods and services from 2007 
until July 2015 when it was shut down by the Federal 
Bureau of Investigations (Europol, 2015). It took only 
two weeks for this marketplace to start operating 
again (Clark, 2015; Kovacs, 2015). 
2. Power  Locker:  a  reseller  that  allows  customers  to 
customize ransomware (Goodin, 2014; Mathews, 2014). 
3. Hacking Team (hackingteam.it): a Milan-based firm that 
focuses on all aspects of offensive cybersecurity. On 
July 8, 2015, WikiLeaks released more than one million 
searchable emails from this Italian surveillance mal-
ware vendor (WikiLeaks, 2015). Moreover, the source 
code for Hacking Team’s flagship software, Remote 
Control System, was breached and used to attack web-
sites in South Korea (Peters, 2015; The Chosunilbo, 
2015).
4. The Styx Exploit Pack: a kit vendor that sells a high-
end software package developed for "the under-
ground" but is marketed and serviced online. A 24-
hour virtual help desk is available to paying customers 
(Krebs, 2013).
Malware suppliers use various modes to provide goods and services to customers. By 
mode, we mean “the way” the malware supplier chooses to function. These modes increase 
monetization opportunities and enable many security breaches worldwide. A theoretically 
sound framework that can be used to examine the various modes that malware suppliers 
use to produce and sell malware is needed. We apply a general model specified recently by 
Hagiu and Wright to study five modes that malware suppliers use to deliver goods and ser-
vices to their customers. The framework presented in this article can be used to predict the 
mode in which a malware supplier will function; to study which types of malware suppliers, 
agents, and customers are attracted to each mode; to discover new modes; and to better un-
derstand the threat a malware supplier presents.
Remove the predators, and the whole ecosystem 
begins to crash like a house of cards.
Brian Skerry
Underwater photojournalist
“ ”
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These examples illustrate that the lack of a theoretic-
ally-grounded framework to examine the nuances of 
the modes in which malware suppliers function 
hinders understanding of how the cybercrime eco-
nomy works and weakens mitigation strategies. 
The choice a firm makes about the mode it uses to de-
liver goods and services to customers is relevant in 
many product markets because of the increase in the 
number and size of online marketplaces that have 
emerged recently (Edelman, 2015; Hagiu, 2007; Hagiu 
& Wright, 2013, 2015b). Moreover, the choice of mode 
a malware supplier uses to deliver goods and services 
is prominent in a market where advances in obfusca-
tion and detection-avoidance techniques, software re-
use, machine learning, and Internet and mobile 
technologies have made it possible to use various ap-
proaches that offer an increasing variety of malware 
goods and services to customers. 
The literature on the different modes in which a firm 
can function can be organized based on the methods 
used to examine them: specification of formal general 
models (Boudreau & Hagiu, 2009; Hagiu, 2007; Hagiu, 
2009; Hagiu & Wright, 2015a; 2015b, 2015c); empirical 
studies (Boudreau, 2010); and informal descriptions 
(Choudary, 2015; Edelman, 2015; Eisenmann et al., 
2006; Hagiu, 2014; Hagiu & Wright, 2013). This study 
focuses on five modes in which a firm can operate that 
have been specified using formal general models: “em-
ployment”, “multisided platform”, “reseller”, “vertic-
ally integrated”, and “input-supplier” (Hagiu, 2007; 
Hagiu, 2009; Hagiu & Wright, 2015a, 2015b, 2015c). 
In the remainder of this article, we summarize the gen-
eral model developed by Hagiu and Wright (2015c) to 
examine the choice a firm with a single agent makes 
among alternate modes to deliver goods and services 
and then apply the general model to examine five ap-
proaches that we believe malware suppliers use to 
provide products and services to their customers. We 
then discuss the contribution of this research and 
provide conclusions. 
General Model with One Firm and One 
Agent
The general model for a firm and a single agent de-
veloped by Hagiu and Wright (2015c) assumes that the 
revenue generated jointly by the firm and the agent de-
pends on three types of actions, all of which are influ-
enced by asset ownership. These actions are referred to 
as being non-contractible. The non-contractible ac-
tions can be organized into three types: i) actions that 
can solely be carried out by the firm, ii) actions that can 
solely be carried out by the agent, and iii) transferable 
actions that can be carried out by either the firm or the 
agent. 
The firm and the agent incur costs carrying out their ac-
tions. These costly actions are expected to increase the 
revenue generated jointly by the firm and the agent. 
Any contract offered by the firm to the agent can only 
depend on the revenue generated by the three types of 
actions, not just one or two types. The firm can offer the 
agent a contract that consists of a fixed fee and a vari-
able fee equal to a percentage of the revenue generated 
jointly by the firm and the agent. The firm or the agent 
can collect revenues and pay the other party their 
share. 
Hagiu and Wright (2015c) examine the case where a 
firm can select to operate in one of two modes: “em-
ployment” and “multisided platform”. The difference 
between the two modes is that the firm controls the 
transferable actions in the “employment” mode and 
the agent controls the transferable actions in the 
“multisided platform” mode. A side refers to an actor 
type. For example, a two-sided platform may enable in-
dividuals seeking employment and employers to inter-
act directly. Similarly, a multisided platform may 
enable service providers, customers, and customers’ 
customers to interact directly. 
According to Hagiu and Wright (2015b), two features 
make the multisided platform mode special. First, the 
multisided platform enables direct interactions 
between agents and customers. The phrase “direct in-
teractions” is used to mean that the agent and the cus-
tomers, not the firm, retain control over the key terms 
of the interaction. These terms can include price, bund-
ling, delivery, quality, and so on.
The second feature that makes the multisided platform 
special is that both the agent and the customers are af-
filiated to the multisided platform. Agents make cash 
and in-kind investments in the multisided platform to 
interact with customers and form expectations of fu-
ture returns from these investments. Similarly, anticip-
ating returns, customers make cash and in-kind 
investments in the multisided platform to interact dir-
ectly with the agent. 
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Examining Modes Used by a Malware Suppli-
er with One Agent 
Consider the case where there is one malware supplier, 
one agent, one or more customers, and one or more 
customers’ customers. Assume that the malware suppli-
er is a technical organization with malware goods and 
services as its output. To produce and sell malware to 
customers, the malware supplier needs to choose one 
of the five modes illustrated in Figure 1: 
1. Employment mode: employ and incentivize an agent 
to provide goods and service to customers 
2. Multisided platform mode: enable the affiliated agent 
to provide goods and services directly to affiliated 
customers
3. Reseller  mode:  buy  from  a  seller  and  resell  to cus-
tomers
4. Vertically  integrated  mode:  work  for  a vertically in-
tegrated organization
5. Input supplier mode: sell inputs to a kit vendor who 
in turn incorporates those inputs in goods and ser-
vices they sell to their customers
Figure 1. Modes to supply malware goods and services to customers
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Further assume that the role of the agent is the same in 
all five modes: help monetize the output of the malware 
supplier. In the “employment” mode, the agent is an 
employee of the malware supplier. In the “multisided 
platform” mode, the agent is an affiliated independent 
professional who is enabled by the malware supplier’s 
multisided platform to provide goods and services dir-
ectly to customers. In the “reseller” mode, the agent 
(shown as Seller in Figure 1) sells those goods and ser-
vices to the malware supplier that their customers wish 
to purchase. In the “vertically integrated” mode, both 
the agent and the malware supplier are employees of 
the same organization. In the “input supplier” mode, 
the agent is either an employee of the malware supplier 
or has no role. The malware supplier sells inputs to kit 
vendors, and these inputs become part of the goods 
and services kit vendors sell to customers located down-
stream in the value chain. 
Table 1 provides an example of non-contractible ac-
tions organized into the three action types identified 
in the previous section. Note that the information on 
Table 1 depends on the role of the agent. Recall that, in 
our example, the agent’s role is to help monetize the 
outputs of the malware supplier. If the role of the 
agent was a technical one, the information in rows de-
noted 2 and 3 in Table 1 would be different. 
The non-contractible actions that can solely be carried 
out by the malware supplier are those which are part 
of an ongoing investment in the firm. These actions 
are non-transferable. The non-contractible actions 
that can solely be carried out by the agent are those 
that are part of an ongoing effort made by the agent in 
the provision of its service. These actions are also non-
transferable. 
Table 1. Non-contractible actions by type
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Non-contractible actions that can be carried out by the 
malware supplier or the agent are referred to as transfer-
able actions. In the general model with one agent de-
veloped by Hagiu and Wright (2015c), the mode in which 
the malware supplier operates depends on whether the 
firm or the agent controls the transferable actions. In our 
example, if the malware supplier chooses to operate in 
the “employment” mode or the “vertically integrated 
mode,” it must control the transferable actions shown in 
row 3 of Table 1. 
The main difference between the “employment” and 
“vertically integrated” modes is that, in the “employ-
ment” mode, the malware supplier employs the agent; 
whereas, in the “vertically integrated” mode, the mal-
ware supplier and the agent both work for a vertically in-
tegrated organization. If the malware supplier chooses 
to operate in the "platform” mode, it must enable the 
agent to control transferable actions. 
What is less clear is how to best apply the general model 
with one agent developed by Hagiu and Wright (2015c) 
to the “reseller” and “input supplier” modes. Hagiu 
(2007) formally compared the “reseller” and “two-sided 
platform” modes using four fundamental economic 
factors: indirect network effects between buyers and 
sellers; asymmetric information between sellers and the 
intermediary; investment incentives; and product com-
plementarities/substitutability. Hagiu concluded that 
the “reseller” mode is more profitable when the degree 
of complementarity among sellers’ products is higher 
and it is very difficult to bring the two-sides to the plat-
form together and spark interactions. The “two-sided 
platform” mode is preferred when seller investment in-
centives are important or when there is asymmetric in-
formation regarding seller product quality (Hagiu, 2007). 
This type of guideline focuses on constructs that are diffi-
cult to observe and would be difficult to apply in prac-
tice, particularly when studying the malware market. 
Hagiu and Wright (2015a) compared the “multisided 
platform” mode with the “reseller” mode and concluded 
that the decision of which mode to select depends on 
whether suppliers affiliated to the platform or the re-
seller have more important information relevant to the 
optimal tailoring of marketing activities for each specific 
product. When applied to our example, we interpret the 
conclusion in Hagiu and Wright (2015a) to mean that the 
“reseller” mode requires the malware supplier to have 
control rights over important information that is relev-
ant to assemble and update the product–market fit of 
the goods and services provided to customers. 
The supplier input mode has not been formally studied 
as much as the other four modes have been. Hagiu and 
Wright (2015b) made two observations when informally 
comparing the “input supplier” and the “multisided 
platform” modes. The first observation was that, when 
a firm operates in the “input supplier” mode, not all rel-
evant customer types are on board. However, when the 
firm operates in the “multisided platform” mode, all rel-
evant customer types are affiliated to the platform. The 
second observation was that, when the firm operates in 
the “input supplier” mode, it does not benefit from in-
direct network effects between users and application 
developers. 
For the purpose of our example, we interpret the obser-
vations by Hagiu and Wright (2015b) to mean that, 
when operating in the “input supplier” mode, the mal-
ware supplier derives benefits from bringing on board 
kit vendors as customers, but does not find significant 
benefits by bringing onboard the kit vendors’ custom-
ers. We conclude that the malware supplier and the 
agent will invest in non-contractible actions related to 
supporting kit vendors but not downstream customers. 
Contribution
The framework presented in this article can be used to 
anticipate the mode in which a malware supplier with 
one agent will function. If a malware supplier controls 
the un-contractible actions that could be carried out by 
the agent, it will function in the “employment” mode. If 
the malware supplier enables the affiliated agent to in-
teract directly with affiliated customers, the malware 
supplier will function in the “multisided platform” 
mode. If the malware supplier has control rights over 
important information that is relevant to assemble and 
update product–market fit of the goods and services 
provided to customers, the malware supplier will oper-
ate in the “reseller” mode. If the malware supplier and 
the agent are both employed by the same organization, 
the malware supplier will function in the “vertically in-
tegrated” mode. If the malware supplier invests in non-
contractible actions to support kit vendors but not 
downstream customers, it will operate in the “input 
supplier” mode. 
The ability to anticipate the modes in which malware 
suppliers will function improves the classification of 
malware suppliers, agents, and customers; it enables 
defences to be tailored to address attacks of a particular 
type; it increases the number and quality of operational 
insights; it enables targeted operations; and it increases 
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the productivity of experimenting with new ways of pro-
tecting organizations and individuals against cyberat-
tacks.
The proposed framework can also be used to study 
which types of malware suppliers, agents, and custom-
ers are attracted to each mode, discover new modes, 
and specify the threat space a malware supplier poses. 
A better understanding of the actors that each mode at-
tracts, an improved ability to discover new modes, and 
an improved specification of the threat space offers to 
lower the impact of improbable events such as those re-
ferred to as “black swan” events (Taleb, 2007). 
Conclusions 
We build on recent advances in the theory of 
multisided platforms to develop a framework that can 
be used to examine the various approaches that mal-
ware suppliers can take to deliver goods and services to 
customers. We provide an elemental model distilled 
from the general model with one agent developed by 
Hagiu and Wright (2015c). By elemental model, we 
mean that the model has been reduced to stark simpli-
city for the purpose of increasing its adoption as an in-
tegrative framework to formally examine the modes in 
which malware suppliers operate. This approach in-
volves judgement, and it is consistent with research 
that attempts to formalize different theories (Gibbons, 
2005). This elemental model is then used to identify five 
modes we believe that malware suppliers use to 
provide goods and services to their customers. 
This study discusses the application of a theoretical 
model, essentially ignoring empirical testing and the 
formal mathematical proofs provided by the research-
ers to specify the various models. The next steps for this 
work are: i) to examine existing known marketplaces for 
the purpose of detailing the framework described in 
this article and ii) to develop a model with multiple 
agents and spillovers that is specific to the modes used 
by malware suppliers. 
This article is the first step to develop a theoretically 
sound framework that can be used to examine the vari-
ous modes that malware suppliers use to produce and 
sell malware. 
We expect a more formal approach to characterizing 
the modes in which malware suppliers function will de-
crease the number and impact of cyberattacks. 
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